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9.1  Introduction and Background 
Capital flows to Central and Eastern  Europe (CEE) and the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) represent a relatively small, albeit growing, share of 
capital flows to developing countries. Taking all flows together, total net 
flows to these twenty-five countries were about $44 billion in  1996 (and a 
preliminary figure of $57 billion for 1997),’ or about one-eighth of aggre- 
gate net flows to all developing countries. These countries accounted, how- 
ever, for about 20 and 22 percent, respectively, of all developing countries’ 
gross domestic product (GDP) and exports in 1996. As a fraction of their 
GDP, total inflows were consequently smaller than for many other devel- 
oping countries, and averaged about 5.4 percent over the 1990-96  period. 
Taking debt service and capital flight into account, resource inflows were 
much lower and even negative to some countries (capital flight from Rus- 
sia alone has been estimated at some $50 billion for 1992-96). 
The lower level of capital flows to these countries occurred during a 
period when global capital flows were very buoyant. Private capital flows 
to developing countries increased  dramatically  during the  1990s, espe- 
cially foreign direct investment  (FDI) and portfolio  equity investment. 
Stijn Claessens is a lead economist in the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group at 
the World Bank. Daniel Oks is manager of the economic analysis department of the Central 
Bank of Argentina. Rossana Polastri is an economist in the Europe and Central Asia Region 
at the World Bank. 
The authors thank their discussant, Michael Dooley, other participants in the preconfer- 
ence and conference, Ricardo Martin, Frank Lysy, Marcelo Selowsky, and participants in a 
World Bank workshop for useful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank. 
1. Excluding grants, the total amount of net flows amounted to US$41 billion in  1996. 
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While flows to CEE and FSU have also been growing fast-for  example, 
portfolio and FDI flows increased from $1.4 billion in 1990 to $23.5 billion 
in 1996-between  them they still attracted only about 15 percent of total 
private capital flows to all developing countries in 1996.2  In 1996, FDI to 
CEE and FSU, for example, was only $14 billion, equivalent to the total 
amount received by  Malaysia and Mexico in that year. The distribution 
of FDI flows has also been highly uneven. Over the 1992-96  period, Rus- 
sia and the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary) received the bulk of FDI flows, while many other 
countries in the region are still a11 but untouched by FDI. 
The still relatively low level of capital flows, especially of private capital, 
reflects the special nature of the economic development processes in these 
countries. Several factors are important. First, CEE and FSU are all tran- 
sition economies. This means, for one thing, that market reforms did not 
get underway until the end of the 1980s for most of CEE-with  the no- 
table exceptions of Hungary and Poland-and  until  1991 for the FSU. 
The transition process also influenced the nature and composition of the 
capital flows. In  particular,  early on in the transition  the capital flows 
were mainly fiscally driven and often from official sources. Annual net 
flows of official development finance-including  official development assis- 
tance (grants and official concessional loans) and official nonconcessional 
loans-represented  about 40 percent of total net flows in  1990-96  and 
over 100 percent in  1990-91  (as private net flows were negative in those 
years). This reflected the sharp deterioration of fiscal revenues at the onset 
of the transition process and the lack of credit worthiness of some coun- 
tries. Associated with this process were low private capital inflows, and, as 
mentioned, for some countries substantial amounts of capital flight. The 
low level of private inflows was due to a variety of factors, including partial 
and incomplete reforms or an uncertain commitment to reform in most 
countries, high political and social costs of the transition process itself, 
and high levels of corruption and political instability (several countries in 
the FSU have been affected by  civil wars). Many countries in CEE also 
lost financing and aid from the Soviet Union-they  had received a large 
amount of aid, including above-market export prices and below-market 
import (especially energy) prices, from the Soviet Union  (World Bank 
1992), but these flows essentially ceased in 1989-implying  a larger financ- 
ing need for their governments. 
In more recent years, there has been a more rapid  inflow of private 
capital, as reform efforts have consolidated and economic prospects im- 
proved and, for some countries, as European Union (EU) integration be- 
came a possibility for the near future. For some countries, short-term capi- 
tal has recently become an important source of external financing. Since 
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most countries have been “latecomers” to the phenomenon of large pri- 
vate capital inflows, they have not experienced much of the overheating 
phenomena  that  have  affected  other  developing countries  in  the  past 
(Latin America) and recently (East Asia). The main exceptions, indeed, 
were precisely some of the earlier and faster reformers like Hungary, Po- 
land, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. 
At the same time, the transition to a market economy is far from com- 
plete for most of the economies in the region. Distortions in factor mar- 
kets are still prevalent and the institutional development in areas crucial 
to beneficial financial integration-particularly  the legal system and fi- 
nancial sector-is  still limited, especially in many of countries of the FSU. 
Deficiencies, which in  other developing countries have been associated 
with subsequent problems, including poor resource allocation and finan- 
cial crises, are thus still prevalent in many transition economies. By  tack- 
ling these issues now, these countries could presumably stand to gain more 
of the benefits and to run less of the risks associated with more financial 
integration and large private capital flows. 
This paper investigates the amounts, types and sources of capital flows 
to these countries.  It tries  to determine the motivation  of  the various 
sources of capital flows, distinguishing global and country-specific factors. 
The paper provides estimates of the (econometric) relationships between, 
on one hand, the different kinds of capital flows and, on the other hand, 
the reform process, macroeconomic fundamentals and performance, and 
external factors. Because the history of capital flows to CEE and FSU is 
short, historical analysis has significant limitations and econometric esti- 
mation is difficult. Lessons from experiences of other countries with pri- 
vate capital flows may, however, be applied to these countries, when taking 
into account their special characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 briefly describes the facts 
about  capital flows to these countries. Section 9.3 discusses important 
links and relationships between macroeconomic variables and the capital 
flows, including some of the basic motivations and causes for capital flows. 
Section 9.4 describes and analyzes the policy framework and policy re- 
sponses in those countries that received the bulk of capital flows. Econo- 
metric tests are presented in section 9.5, while section 9.6 discusses the 
issues surrounding capital flows that may in the future arise in these coun- 
tries, and provides some conclusions. 
9.2  Facts about Capital Flows to Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
We start by providing some simple raw statistics for the various capital 
flows. In principle, one can distinguish capital flows by destination (e.g., 
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bonds and equity portfolios); and by origin (e.g., commercial, that is pri- 
vate, versus official creditors). One can also combine the three distinctions, 
for example, by splitting debt-type flows into public and private debt, with 
the latter further into long and short, and by origin, for example, commer- 
cial versus official. For our purposes, and given the data we  have at hand 
and the patterns in capital flows we  observe, we  create five categories of 
capital flows: public debt (official) flows; commercial long-term (LT) debt 
flows; commercial short-term (ST) debt flows; FDI flows; and portfolio 
(bond and equity) flows. For some purposes, it would be useful to further 
split commercial debt flows into those going to the banking system and 
those going to other  sectors of the economy, but it turns out that this 
cannot be done for most of the countries given the data available. Our 
focus is on net flows; however, while we occasionally also discuss “capital 
flight” (other than that captured through short-term flows), we do not net 
out capital flight from our net flow measures. We group countries in two 
regions: (1) Central Europe and the Baltics, and (2) the rest of Eastern Eu- 
rope, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.3  The group of countries in Central 
Europe is relatively homogeneous. The countries in the second regional 
group have more diverse economic  characteristic^.^ 
Descriptive statistics for the different types of flows for all countries 
(means, medians, standard deviations of flows) are provided in table 9.1. 
Table 9.2 describes the composition of capital flows by source (private and 
official) and by  type (long-term, short-term, portfolio,  and FDI). Total 
capital flows rose from around $1 billion in  1990 to $57 billion in 1997. 
Pooling together all observations (by country and by year) and measuring 
them as a share of GDP, the largest types of flows during the 1992-96  pe- 
riod were official debt flows and FDI (on average, respectively, 2.7 percent 
and 2 percent of GDP), followed by portfolio flows (0.4 percent of GDP). 
Of  all these flows, the highest standard deviation was  for official flows 
(standard deviation of 3.6 percent of GDP). The following other stylized 
facts can be ob~erved.~ 
First, the share of official flows has declined sharply over the period (fig. 
9.1). At the beginning of the transition, official flows increased sharply, 
with bilateral and multilateral sources accounting for most of the flows. In 
1992, as some of the transition economies regained access to international 
credit markets, private flows began to exceed official flows and by  1997 
3. The CEE and Baltics country group includes Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slo- 
vakia, and Slovenia. The FSU country group includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor- 
gia,  Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz  Republic,  Moldova, Russia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, and 
Ukraine. 
4. We  had to be careful for the exchange rate used in calculating dollar GDP given the 
large changes in real exchange rate for this period. Some smoothing was necessary, which 
was done using the World Bank Atlas $-GDP figures. 
5. Sobol (1996) also highlights the rapid surge in private capital flows to CEE. Table 9.1  Capital Flows to CEE and FSU Countries: Descriptive Statistics (percentage of GDP per year) 
Total  Private  Official  Commercial  Short-Term 
Capital  Capital  Capital  FDI  Portfolio  Debt  Debt 
Mean  5.92  3.22  2.70  1.98  0.41  0.85  0.56 
Median  4.89  2.11  1.78  I .03  0.00  0.18  0.12 
Maximum  21.02  17.48  15.04  17.48  10.15  10.92  13.10 
Minimum  -3.12  -1.95  -2.98  0.00  -3.33  -2.98  -10.67 
Standard deviation  4.84  3.73  3.57  2.61  1.66  1.89  2.49 Table 9.2  Size and Composition of Net Capital Flows (US$ millions) 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Central Europe, Baltics, and FSU 
4,700  13,231  18,939 
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they accounted for 73 percent of total flows. This development is not dif- 
ferent from what has been observed in other developing countries, but in 
these transition economies the change in composition appears to have oc- 
curred more swiftly. The reduced reliance on official flows has been more 
marked in Central Europe and the Baltics than in the FSU. While FDI 
and portfolio flows were already large in Central Europe and the Baltics 
in 1991-92,  they only acquired significance in the FSU after 1994. This is 
consistent with the onset of earlier reforms and improved access to inter- 
national capital markets of Central Europe and the Baltics. 
Second, there has been a rapid surge of short-term capital flows (short- 
term debt plus portfolio flows) from about $1 billion in 1991-92  to $20 
billion in 1996-97-with  the share in total flows increasing from 5 percent 
to about one-quarter (fig. 9.2). The surge in short-term flows could be a 
source of concern for policy makers, as short-term flows could be associ- 
ated with higher volatility. This may be especially so for those countries 
that received the bulk of short-term flows: During  1993-96,  the largest 
recipients were Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, 
and Slovenia, with these countries in total receiving over 90 percent of all 
short-term flows. 
Third, the destination of private capital flows has been heavily concen- 
trated.6 A few countries-Russia,  Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Re- 
6. Defined  as the sum of  FDI, portfolio flows, commercial debt flows, and short-term 
flows. Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  307 
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Fig. 9.2  Long-term and short-term capital flows, CEE and FSU countries 
public-together  accounted for about 80 percent of private capital flows 
to the region (fig. 9.3). The above four countries, along with a second 
group of countries-Romania,  Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Croatia-accounted  for about 98 percent of all 
private capitalaflows to the region. The concentration for FDI was even 
higher. Two countries, Poland and Hungary, for example, received over 50 
percent of the 1992-96  cumulative FDI to the region ($46 billion). 
Fourth, official capital flows-excluding  flows from the International 
Monetary Fund (1MF)-have  also been heavily concentrated, although 
mostly in a different set of countries than private flows. On a cumulative ba- 
sis during 1992-96,  five countries (Romania, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Bulgaria) received over 75 percent of all official flows (fig. 9.4). Some 
of the earlier recipients of official flows subsequently repaid large amounts 
of  official debt and, thus, on a net cumulative basis, the significance of 
official financing for these countries is somewhat understated. Russia and 
Poland, for example, received around $2.4 billion in official financing in 
1993-94  and repaid over $3 billion in 1996. 
9.3  Linkages between Macroeconomic Variables and Capital Flows 
We start with a description of some of the initial conditions that played 
an important role in determining the nature and type of capital inflows. 308  Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and Rossana Polastri 
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Fig. 9.4  Major recipients of official capital, 1990-96 
The underlying factors behind private flows are quite different from those 
underlying official flows. In the case of private flows, credit worthiness- 
as a result of structural reforms and strong macroeconomic fundamen- 
tals-and  economic and financial opportunities-such  as high interest 
rate differentials-tend  to drive flows. In the case of official flows, political 
considerations (including geopolitical or social stability), commitment to 
reforms (usually reflected in the conditions applied to official financing), Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  309 
and the fiscal deficit tend to be important determinants. We therefore dis- 
cuss private and official flows separately. 
9.3.1  Private Flows 
Private capital flows depend on domestic factors and international fac- 
tors,  such  as  foreign interest  rates  or demand  conditions  abroad  (see 
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart  1993). In turn, domestic factors can be 
broadly classified into structural reforms (e.g., openness, privatization, fi- 
nancial sector deepening, banking sector stability), credit worthiness and 
macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., fiscal deficit, debt to GDP ratio, ratio 
of short-term debt or monetary base to foreign reserves), private sector 
behavior (e.g., propensity to save), economic performance indicators (e.g., 
GDP growth), and arbitrage opportunities (e.g., domestic-foreign interest 
rate differentials adjusted for expected devaluation). As we  discuss below, 
different types of private flows are likely to depend differently on specific 
subsets of these explanatory variables. 
The importance of credit worthiness is well  illustrated  by  the experi- 
ences of Poland and Hungary. Poland started the transition period with a 
large commercial debt stock, the result  of heavy borrowing  during the 
early 1980s in an attempt to maintain domestic consumption and govern- 
ment expenditures. As this borrowing occurred under the “umbrella” of 
the then Soviet Union, Poland’s individual credit worthiness mattered less. 
The subsequent political transition and loss of the umbrella resulted, how- 
ever, in a rapid loss of credit worthiness in the late 1980s. Poland subse- 
quently had to go through first a Paris and then a Brady plan debt reduc- 
tion and debtarelief program to bring its debt back to sustainable levels. It 
took until October 1994 before the Brady debt reduction plan was com- 
pleted and only afterward did private capital flows take off. 
Bulgaria also had to go through a debt reduction and rescheduling op- 
eration after it incurred large amounts of hard currency debt in the late 
1980s when aid from the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. Following 
Bulgaria’s Brady debt agreement, private capital flows became positive for 
the first time since the onset of transition, and particularly after the coun- 
try adopted a currency board in mid-1997. It appears that the currency 
board provided an implicit exchange rate insurance that, combined with 
a high interest rate differential and increased credit worthiness (through 
both debt reduction and lengthening of the maturities of external debt), 
attracted private capital flows. 
In the case of Hungary, the initial debt stock was also high, but Hungary 
(did  not resort to debt rescheduling or reduction. This signaled Hungary’s 
commitment to servicing its international obligations in full and on time; 
that, in turn, may have bolstered other kinds of private inflows. Until 1995, 
Hungary was the largest recipient of private capital flows in the region. 
However, Hungary relied mostly on FDI and portfolio flows for its financ- 310  Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and Rossana Polastri 
ing needs as commercial lenders were reluctant to extend large amounts 
of new financing (in part this was also due to problems with the provision 
of accurate balance-of-payment information during the 1980s). 
Initially, Russia was in a somewhat better position than most countries as 
its  outstanding  debt  obligations were relatively low.  But large  borrow- 
ings during the late 1980s, much of it from official sources, led to subse- 
quent debt servicing problems, which were partly resolved through re- 
peated reschedulings. Nevertheless, debt stocks and debt service remained 
and remain high relative to exports and GDP (it should be noted, however, 
that Russia has run consistently large trade surpluses). In the case of Rus- 
sia, what led to large private inflows was probably not so much (the per- 
ception of) improved credit worthiness, but rather the very high interest 
rates on government bonds. In 1996, Russia received $7.3 billion in portfo- 
lio flows, most of it to finance the government deficit. 
For the rest of  the FSU,  inherited  debt stocks were zero as they  all 
reached agreement in the early 1990s for Russia to assume all debts and as- 
sets of the FSU (as the states of the FSU had each signed a joint and several 
liability agreement for the external debt, assumption of claims was nec- 
essary and the only practical solution). This “zero debt” initial condition 
was a factor in why early reformers-like  most of the Baltics-were  able 
to attract substantial private flows from the outset, almost $3 billion over 
the 1992-96 period. 
Non-debt-creating private flows to the region, including FDI, were low 
until 1990 (less than half a billion dollars annually) with, as noted, most 
of it going to Hungary. The transition to market economies created oppor- 
tunities for foreigners to engage in long-term risk investments in the re- 
gion. But even though FDI grew, from $2.2 billion in 1991 to $6.4 billion 
in 1994, it remained small relative to other regions. In 1994, for example, 
it was less than FDI to Mexico in that year. As reform in these countries 
further progressed, FDI rose significantly,  reaching $16.1 billion in 1995- 
although this figure is  somewhat distorted by  record-high privatization- 
related FDI in Hungary ($4.5 billion in  1995).’ This reflected in part a 
general increase in FDI to developing countries. But there also appears to 
have been a threshold effect such that, once reform passed a certain level, 
a takeoff of private capital flows in general occurred (fig. 9.5). 
Domestic reforms aimed at liberalizing prices, trade, and private sector 
activities have been very important for motivating the inflow of  private 
capital. Countries did pursue many policies to attract capital flows, in par- 
ticular they quite rapidly liberalized their current and capital accounts. In 
addition, some provided official guarantees for flows to private borrowers, 
while others provided special tariff or tax regimes to attract FDI flows. 
Compared to the impact of general reform, however, specific policies ap- 
pear to have played a limited role in explaining capital flows. 
7. FDI averaged $14.7 billion in 1996-97 Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  311 
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Fig. 9.5  Net private capital flows (line) and reform efforts (columns) 
Some countries experienced large private capital inflows to private com- 
panies and state enterprises early on, even prior to the transition, but this 
most often reflected special circumstances. Several countries are well en- 
dowed with natural resources and were as a result able to attract FDI in 
these sectors, even when overall market reforms were still at an early stage. 
About half of total net inflows for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in  1995 
and 1996, for example, were in the form of FDI, even though they scored 
low on policy reform. In other countries, the privatization strategy that 
was pursued greatly influenced capital flows (fig. 9.6). For example, since 
the onset of transition, Estonia, and Hungary even earlier, pursued a pol- 
icy of actively selling firms on a case-by-case basis to strategic investors, 
including foreign investors. As a result, FDI inflows dominate private in- 
flows for both countries (FDI inflows to Hungary actually exceeded in 
1996 total net flows). And in the case of Russia in recent years, FDI flows 
have increased significantly as a result of the privatization of a few large 
resource-based state enterprises. 
Capital flows have also been influenced by  the behavior  of domestic 
savings. Theoretically, foreign savings can be a complement to or a substi- 
tute for private domestic savings. The type of relationship between capital 
flows and domestic savings can have a bearing on the sustainability of 
capital  flows. Hernandez and Rudolph  (1995) found  for  economies in 
other regions that capital flows tend to be more sustainable when foreign 
and domestic savings are complementary. Figure 9.7 suggests a complemen- 
tarity between aggregate domestic savings and total private flows. Based on 
this complementarity alone, capital flows are likely to be sustainable. 
A few countries have had (temporary) situations of “overheating” asso- 
ciated with  large private  capital inflows (excluding FDI). For example, 8 
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private debt flows were large in the Czech Republic and Slovakia during 
1995; and portfolio flows were large in Poland and Hungary during 1995, 
in Russia during 1996, and in Poland during 1997. For the region as a 
whole, however, short-term private flows (excluding FDI) were insignifi- 
cant before 1993 and were less than one-third of all flows thereafter. More 
importantly, with a few exceptions, the share of capital flows relative to 
GDP  remained small. Relative to GDP, only the Czech Republic and Hun- 
gary received in 1995 large amounts of private capital flows-10.9  percent 
and 8.2 percent, respectively. So did some of the smaller FSU countries in 
some specific years, but this mainly reflected the lumpy nature of private 
capital flows (eg,  FDI in a gold mine in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1995-96) 
or, in the case of some Baltics, heavy intermediation of foreign funds by 
local banks. Even these relatively high levels of capital inflows were well 
below the sustained high levels of capital inflows seen in recent years for 
some East Asian and Latin American countries, for those countries had 
several years of current account deficits up to 8 to 9 percent that were 
largely privately financed and, unlike in transition economies, often asso- 
ciated with strong declines in domestic saving (see Alba et al. 1999). 
Though not for the region as a whole, there are several cases where fi- 
nancial arbitrage likely played a major role in motivating capital flows. For 
example, in recent years, there has been substantial foreign investment in 
portfolio flows in the form of purchases of local currency fixed-income in- 
struments, such as Russian, Polish, Hungarian, and Czech treasury bills 
and treasury bonds. Table 9.3 suggests a positive link between high inter- 
est rate differentials (domestic interest rates corrected for the ex post ex- 
change rate devaluation minus the U.S.-dollar London Inter-Bank Offer- 
ing Rate [LIBOR]) and private capital inflows in these countries. For some 
countries, bond inflows have coincided with large and rapid equity port- 
folio inflows, much of it through American depositary receipts (ADRs)/ 
global depositary receipts (GDRs) and country funds. In the Czech Re- 
public, for example, there were large equity inflows in  1995 when the eq- 
uity market increased by  150 percent.8 Similarly, Estonian banks relied 
heavily on foreign issues of Eurobonds to lower their funding costs during 
1996-97. As demand for paper of emerging economies in CEE grew, do- 
mestic interest rates declined. The eruption of financial turbulence in Asia 
led to substantial outflows and a steep rise in spreads of Eurobonds issued 
by these countries over comparable U.S. treasuries (as well as declines in 
stock markets). This was especially the case for Russia, Estonia, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic, but affected more or less all countries in the region. 
Since then, spreads have declined to close to pre-Asian  crisis levels. 
Figure 9.8 shows that there has been a positive association  between 
8. Foreign purchases of equity securities increased from $497 million in  1994 to $1,236 
million in 1995. Table 9.3  Nonequity Portfolio Flows and Interest Rate Differential 
Poland  Czech Republic  Slovak Republic  Hungary  Russia 
1995  1996  1997.'  1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996 
Nonequity 
portfolio (in 
US$millions)  250  -531  2,200  733  1,288  562  218  210  -264  2,124  1,729  -1,873  -184  -1,576  -2,320 
Interest rate 
differential (YO)  14.4  7.6  0.2  8.3  15.6  6.1  5.5  19.4  5.1  6.4  4.7  -2.3  n.a.  22.1  57.5 
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domestic credit growth and private capital inflows for only a few countries. 
The association for these countries stems both from general equilibrium 
effects and from  banks directly intermediating capital flows. The large 
credit growth often seen in other developing countries has thus been much 
less observed for these countries. This may be due to the early phase of the 
expansionary cycle for most countries or to the poor state of institutional 
development  of  the  banking  systems in these  countries,  where  foreign 
lenders are reluctant to lend large amounts to still weak banks.  Direct 
intermediation of foreign savings through domestic banks has, for most 
countries, been limited. An exception has been Estonia, where in 1997 the 
banking sector relied heavily on foreign issues of Eurobonds to finance 
their domestic lending. Because of the general equilibrium effects of cap- 
ital inflows, however, there were a few other countries where high credit 
growth and large capital inflows coincided (e.g., the Czech Republic). 
Finally, while policy variables are what matter most from the point of 
view of policy makers, there is evidence that capital inflows have been of- 
ten associated with improvements in key macroeconomic performance indi- 
cators such as GDP growth. As figure 9.9 illustrates, private capital flows 
exhibit a positive relationship with GDP growth. This highly observable 
performance indicator may serve as a proxy, to private investors, for effec- 
tive reforms. 
9.3.2  Official Flows 
In the early stages of reform in CEE and FSU, a major share of official 
assistance took the form of balance of payments and budgetary support, 
including official debt relief. This was necessary as the transition meant a 
substantial drop in fiscal revenues, especially for the FSU countries where 
government revenues essentially collapsed. Receipts from the state enter- 
prise sector fell sharply, partly as a result of privatization, partly as a result 
of the elimination (or reductions) of price subsidies, and partly as a result 
of a breakdown of the tax system. Price liberalization brought into the open 
the extensive systems of cross-subsidies inherent in the planned economy, 
shifting all or most of the cost onto the budget. Also, the new tax adminis- 
trations proved unable to tax the emerging sectors. At the same time, there 
were pressures to maintain expenditures, especially for social purposes. 
Fiscal deficits were large in many transition economies during 1990-96, 
averaging 6 to 7 percent of GDP in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Uzbekistan. 
They were even higher in Russia-an  average of 8.5 percent of GDP  dur- 
ing 1992-96-and  continued to be high in 1997. In addition, governments 
often mandated the banking system to undertake quasi-fiscal activities- 
most often extending (subsidized) credits to state enterprises (Claessens 
and Peters [1997] analyze the case of Bulgaria; Claessens and Abdelati 
[  19961 the case of Romania).  Among slower reformers, credit subsidies 
from the central bank were on the order of three times the size of the fiscal 
deficit (De Melo and Denizer 1997). Much of these fiscal and quasi-fiscal + Estonia 
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deficits ended up being funded through seignorage and inflation tax. Sei- 
gnorage averaged more than 16 percent of GDP  in Russia during 1992-93, 
about the same as total central government revenues (Easterly and Viera 
da Cunha 1994). In CEE, it was more modest, averaging 5 to 6 percent of 
GDP in Poland and Hungary during 1990-92. As figure 9.10 shows, offi- 
cial flows tend to have a close relationship with the fiscal deficits; the two 
variables indeed have one of the closest correlation  relationships for all 
types of capital flows and various possible explanatory variables (a corre- 
lation coefficient of -0.69,  where a fiscal deficit is defined negative). 
Official support (from international financial institutions and individual 
country donors) provided partial financing for these fiscal deficits, thus 
reducing inflationary pressures. Official support, however, was also condi- 
tioned on reform efforts and has typically been larger, relative to popula- 
tion or GDP, for those countries that subsequently advanced further with 
reforms. For example, the Visegrad countries, the most advanced reform- 
ers (along with the Baltics), had received by  the end of  1993 more than 
half of all the disbursements of international financial institutions to the 
region. Total official disbursements to the CEE, which have generally pro- 
gressed farthest in their reforms, accounted for an average of about 2.7 
percent of their GDP in  1991-93,  actually comparable to the Marshall 
Plan (aid under the Marshall Plan after World War I1 averaged 2.5 percent 
of the incomes of recipient countries during the period it was being dis- 
bursed). External official finance has thus helped underpin a number of Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  319 
reform and stabilization programs, create confidence (as was true of the 
Polish stabilization fund), and reduce the need for monetary financing to 
cover budget deficits. Bilateral and multilateral (mainly the EU) assistance 
has also had a large component of technical assistance. 
But for sustained reformers the period of official flows was short: the 
Czech Republic, for example, drew on IMF  credits and other official loans 
relatively heavily in  1991 and 1992, but started to repay the IMF earlier 
than planned-as  did Poland  and Hungary in  1995. Similarly, Estonia 
maintains an IMF program but does not draw from it. This may explain 
why  there is a negative correlation between the reform index and official 
flows for the whole period. A  simple regression  of  a reform  index on 
lagged official flows-see  section 9.5-indeed  suggests that official flows 
have exerted a positive impact on subsequent reforms. The results in sec- 
tion 9.5 also suggest that countries that reformed significantly over the pe- 
riod managed to attract higher private flows and may, thus, have experi- 
enced less need for official flows. 
In  1994, official lending shifted to the FSU, which had previously ob- 
tained  little  official financing,  as  reforms  advanced  there.  But  reform 
strengths did differ considerably among FSU countries, and so did official 
flows. Among the FSU, the Baltic states, which had made substantial re- 
forms, received more official assistance in relation to the size of their pop- 
ulation  as well  as to GDP than, for example, did Belarus. Even today, 
many transition economies in the FSU still depend heavily on external 
capital flows for the financing for their fiscal deficits, with much of this 
financing from official sources. This is especially the case in Central Asia 
and some of the Caucasus countries, where official flows have been more 
than 5 percent of GDP for several countries. Relatively few countries have 
been successful in attracting private capital flows to finance their fiscal 
deficits. Most notable among these countries was Hungary and, in the last 
two years, Russia, which received some private inflows, mostly in the form 
of Eurobonds, for fiscal deficit financing. 
In summary, official flows have been fiscally driven (for a review of  the 
special fiscal issues experienced by transition economies see Buiter 1996). 
In conjunction, a commitment to subsequent reform appears to have been 
an important determinant of official flows. The access to capital markets 
that reforms have facilitated  (at least in the most advanced reformers), 
however, has meant that official financing was quickly substituted by pri- 
vate capital flows (even though successful reformers usually still rely on 
official flows as contingent support). 
9.4  Dealing with Capital Flows: The Policy Framework 
As noted, countries improved the framework for capital flows largely 
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tization, decentralization, stabilization, and institutional changes. Capital 
inflows have in general rewarded successful reforms and good policies by 
helping to finance investment needs and, in the case of FDI, by helping to 
improve productivity and access to foreign markets-thus  helping to fos- 
ter the further integration of transition economies into the global econ- 
omy. While the benefits are clear, however, the crises in Mexico and Asia 
suggest that rapid surges of-particularly  short-term-capital  flows over 
a short time span can also pose difficulties to macroeconomic and finan- 
cial sector management. 
In CEE and FSU, only a few countries-and  only recently-needed  to 
deal with the potentially adverse effects of large capital inflows. There has 
consequently, in general, been little need for the responses traditionally 
employed when countries have faced large capital inflows (i.e., steriliza- 
tion, exchange rate management, capital controls, prudential measures, 
capital outflow liberalization, and fiscal restraint; see further Corbo and 
Hernandez 1996). To illustrate policy responses to recent surges of capital 
inflows, we focus on the experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland, Esto- 
nia, Hungary, and Russia. 
9.4.1  The Czech Republic 
Following the initial transition years, when capital inflows were largely 
dominated by  official sources, private capital flows became imp~rtant.~ 
After averaging around $2.5 billion annually in 1993-94  (over 80 percent 
of which was private finance), capital inflows rose in 1995 to $7.7 billion, 
before declining to about $4 billion in 1996. These large private capital 
inflows were strongly driven by Czech reforms-including  the restructur- 
ing needs that followed large-scale privatization, the gradual liberalization 
of its current and capital accounts starting in 1991, its overall conservative 
fiscal policy (with on average a fiscal deficit close to zero in 1993-96), and 
a relatively stable foreign exchange rate combined with a high differential 
between Czech and foreign interest rates. Expectations of exchange rate ap- 
preciation were also an important factor, particularly in motivating port- 
folio inflows. Strong debt flows occurred in 1995-96,  as bank and enter- 
prises borrowed abroad heavily, reflecting the high interest differentials. 
Also, FDI trebled between 1994 and 1995, to about $2.5 billion, explained 
largely by  the sale of 27 percent of the equity of the Czech telephone 
company to a Dutch-led consortium (collecting a record $1.45 billion in a 
single transaction). 
As the exchange rate was fixed with respect to the deutsche mark (DM), 
the Czech Republic’s largest trading partner, and inflation remained at 
around 10 percent the real exchange rate appreciated sharply during the 
1994-96  period. Increases in inflation from wage pressures and slow pro- 
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ductivity growth led to large increases in relative unit labor costs. A cur- 
rent account surplus in 1993 (equivalent to 2 percent of GDP) turned into 
a large deficit in 1997 (equivalent to 7 percent of GDP) and a significant 
export slowdown followed in  1996 and 1997. Since 1996, net capital in- 
flows have declined sharply and the scarcity of foreign financing has been 
reflected in an increasing interest rate spread between the Prague Inter- 
Bank Offering Rate (PRIBOR) and LIBOR; the spread rose from around 
5 percent in March 1995 to almost 9 percent in early 1997. 
The Czech Republic was initially reluctant to interfere with the large 
capital flows, consistent with its laissez-faire approach to economic man- 
agement. As capital flows grew in 1995, however, the Czech government 
started with large sterilized interventions through open market operations, 
higher reserve requirements on demand and time deposits, and depositing 
privatization receipts with the central bank. This resulted in a further real 
appreciation and rise in interest rates. While the adverse monetary impact 
of reserve growth was partially  avoided, high capital inflows continued, 
motivated increasingly by higher interest rates. The movements in the in- 
terest spread followed the capital flow cycle: During the first phase, “exog- 
enous”  capital  flows  driven  by  sustained  reforms  lowered  the  interest 
differential, but as the current account moved into deficit and the pace of 
reforms slowed down, higher interest rates were necessary to maintain the 
“flow of capital.” 
In March 1996, the government tried to deter speculative capital flows 
by widening the exchange rate band from 1.5 percent to 15 percent-that 
is, +7.5 percent around the central parity. The measure had the desired 
effect of slowing down and in fact reversing short-term capital inflows. 
The government did not, however, tighten its fiscal stance or introduce 
capital controls. Following a banking sector crisis in early 1997 (in which 
several larger banks were liquidated), and following the growing percep- 
tion that enterprise and bank restructuring has been advanced less than 
initially thought, there was a speculative run against the Czech koruna. 
This led to a sharp downward correction in stock market prices and siz- 
able exchange rate devaluation, followed by significant capital outflows in 
mid-1997. The government was subsequently forced to tighten fiscal pol- 
icy and strengthen regulation and supervision of its banking system and 
capital markets. 
9.4.2  Poland 
Official inflows played an important role during the first years of the 
transition,  particularly  in  financing  government  deficits.’O  During  the 
whole 1990-96  period, however, net flows of long-term official credits were 
close to zero as Poland  repaid significant sums. Private capital flows to 
10. This subsection is based in part on Durjasz and Kokoszczynski (1997). 322  Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and Rossana Polastri 
Poland initially lagged behind those to the Czech Republic and Hungary; 
however, a sizable increase occurred  following its commercial debt and 
debt service reduction agreement in  October  1994. The bulk of private 
capital inflows to Poland  after  1994 took the form of FDI, which rose 
from about $1.8 billion annually in 1993-94  to $6.6 billion in 1997. Poland 
became the largest recipient of FDI in the region on a cumulative basis 
over 1992-96. Inflows of FDI to Poland were driven by Poland’s structural 
reforms, the de facto zloty convertibility since 1991 (initially for current 
account  transactions  and later  for most  capital  account  transactions), 
moderate fiscal deficits, overall good macroeconomic performance (high- 
est cumulative growth of the region over  1992-97),  and favorable pros- 
pects for EU membership. Privatization of state enterprises can explain 
about 20 percent of FDI inflows-far  less than in Hungary. Most valuable 
Polish companies have not been privatized yet (copper, telecommunica- 
tions, energy, insurance, and several of the large banks). Portfolio inflows 
became significant in 1995, with purchases of treasury bills by foreigners 
reaching $1 billion that year-encouraged  by high yields and expectations 
of significant nominal zloty appreciation-and  in 1997. In 1996-97,  sev- 
eral banks and companies issued medium-term paper in  the Eurobond 
market and benefited from low and declining spreads, reaching under one 
hundred basis points over equivalent U.S. treasuries in 1997. 
Capital inflows and a current account surplus in  1995 were associated 
with strong monetary and credit expansion and with slow disinflation. A 
20 percent real exchange rate appreciation in  1995-96  was followed by a 
deterioration of the current account balance equivalent to almost 8 per- 
centage pqints of GDP over 1996-97.  The government responded to the 
above concerns with a more flexible exchange rate regime, sterilized inter- 
ventions, and a tightened monetary and fiscal policy. Poland did not rely 
on explicit capital controls to manage adverse capital flows. A permission 
from the central bank for foreign credits and loans with a repayment pe- 
riod of less than twelve months (for services other than commodity circu- 
lation and individuals’ services) appears to have had no significant effect 
on the structure of flows. Similar requirements for longer-term loans and 
credits were lifted as a result of Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) membership negotiations. 
The greatest concern in the second half of 1994 and 1995 was the impact 
on inflation of rapid foreign reserve growth. The largest source of foreign 
reserve accumulation in 1994 and 1995 was “net unclassified transactions” 
of the current account-$9.6  billion between 1995 and the first quarter of 
1996. These refer mostly to flows on account of cross-border trade and 
tourism, motivated by  high price differentials between Poland and Ger- 
many, on one hand, and Poland and countries to the east on the other. 
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and FDI inflows. The government responded with a combination of steri- 
lized interventions and a more flexible exchange rate policy regime. Open 
market operations trebled between the first half of  1994 and the second 
half of  1995. The widely spread perception  that the exchange rate was 
undervalued  led to the creation of a wide exchange rate band of t7  per- 
cent around the central parity in May  1995. The exchange rate quickly 
appreciated to the top of  the band and by years end the band itself was 
appreciated. Following a slowdown in foreign exchange reserve accumula- 
tion since the second quarter of 1996-also  facilitated by the liberalization 
of purchases of foreign assets such as real estate and portfolio investments 
by residents (an OECD membership requirement)-the  central bank was 
able to reduce its sterilization activities  and maintain  the exchange rate 
policy adopted during 1995. The above policies were also supported by a 
deliberate commitment to lower interest  rates as a means to discourage 
portfolio flows driven by high interest rate differentials. The period did see, 
though, a rapid surge in domestic credit associated with a hike in domestic 
aggregate demand and a turnaround of the current account from a 4.6 per- 
cent of GDP surplus in 1995 to a deficit of 1 percent of GDP  in 1996. 
The biggest concern in 1997 was the further deterioration of the external 
current account. Monetary policy was sharply tightened starting early in 
1997, with real interest rates in treasury bills and bonds rising from around 
0 percent in previous years to about 10 percent during the year. To  en- 
hance the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission  mechanism, 
the central bank accepted deposits directly from the public-thus  induc- 
ing some large state-owned banks to raise their deposit rates. With high 
domestic interest rates, there was a new surge of portfolio flows. To reduce 
these inflows, the government responded by eliminating altogether intra- 
band exchange rate interventions, thus effectively raising the exchange rate 
uncertainty faced by short-term speculative capital flows, renewing steril- 
ization activity, and imposing a tighter than anticipated fiscal policy. By 
October, there was a deceleration of credit growth and the current account 
balance ended the year with a 3.2 percent of GDP deficit, substantially 
less than had earlier been anticipated. 
9.4.3  Estonia 
Capital inflows to Estonia were dominated by domestic factors, includ- 
ing the introduction of domestic currency linked through a currency board 
system to the DM, attractive interest rate differentials, structural reforms 
(especially trade and banking sector reform), and an active privatization 
program. Capital inflows (beginning in  1993) preceded the economic re- 
covery-following  four years of  rapid  contraction,  output growth  only 
resumed in 1995. Capital inflows were initially dominated by FDI inflows. 
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all capital flows and a surge in domestic banks’ access to international cap- 
ital markets. The counterpart of the latter development was a rapid surge 
in private domestic credit. Driven by private aggregate demand (fiscal defi- 
cits averaged 0.5 percent of GDP during the 1993-96  period), the current 
account balance declined from a surplus in 1993 to a deficit of over 10 per- 
cent of GDP in  1996 and 13 percent in 1997. Under the currency board 
regime, the central bank’s monetary interventions have been limited to 
buying and selling foreign exchange to preserve the parity with the DM. 
Since there has been no intervention through open market  operations, 
base money growth has been driven by the demand for domestic assets. 
Strong demand for domestic assets led to high growth of monetary base, 
broad money (including foreign exchange deposits), as well as credit be- 
tween 1992 and 1997. Estonia did not resort to capital controls or to steril- 
ization. 
The rapid growth of domestic credit, the declining share of FDI in capi- 
tal inflows, the high current account deficit, and the turmoil in Asia since 
mid- 1997, however, prompted the government to tighten banking sector 
prudential regulations and supervision in late 1997. The latter was aimed 
at curbing fast credit growth and, only indirectly, at curbing portfolio in- 
flows (since banks were funding domestic credit with Eurobond issues). 
The creation of a stabilization fund-whereby  budget surpluses and public 
sector deposits were invested in foreign assets abroad-and  a number of 
other measures aimed at tightening monetary policy and regulations were 
announced in early October 1997. These other measures included raising 
the capital adequacy ratio from 8  percent to 10 percent, curbing local 
government’s borrowing, extending reserve requirements for the banks to 
include net borrowing from abroad, and increasing the daily liquidity re- 
quirement for banks. 
The announcement of these measures, combined with some indications 
from the government that it would remove public sector deposits from 
commercial banks to create the stabilization fund, and previously unantic- 
ipated delays in the funding abroad of several domestic banks, led to a 
liquidity crisis in the banking sector on 20  October  1997. Interest rates 
jumped over three hundred basis points and between 20 October and the 
end of November the stock market price index lost over 60 percent of its 
value. To restore confidence, the central bank decided to bring forward 
the  implementation  of  the  previously  announced  measures  and  an- 
nounced new measures to tighten banking regulations, including a further 
increase in  capital adequacy requirements  to 12 percent-to  be  imple- 
mented at a later (unspecified) stage-and  increases in the liquidity ratios 
of banks. The firm stance of banking regulators and the tightening of fiscal 
policy were conducive to a significant slowdown of credit growth and to 
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9.4.4  Hungary 
As  a reward for its early reform efforts and continuous servicing of its 
foreign debt, Hungary received large capital inflows (including FDI) from 
the early 1990s on.” Lack of fiscal discipline in  1993-94,  however, led to 
a large surge in its current account deficit, reaching almost 10 percent of 
GDP in  1994, and created  an unsustainable  situation. The foreign ex- 
change crisis in 1994 led to an economic downturn, and large debt financ- 
ing to the public sector was necessary. Following fiscal adjustment and a 
devaluation in early 1995, there was a new surge in FDI closely linked to 
an ambitious privatization program (including the privatization of banks 
and some utilities). A sharp fiscal adjustment along with an intensification 
of structural reforms led to a rapid  contraction in the current account 
deficit. Capital inflows declined as the path of fast privatization could not 
be sustained after 1995. 
Sterilized intervention was extensively pursued  during the periods in 
which capital inflows threatened the monetary program. To a lesser extent, 
capital account liberalization also helped as it led to capital outflows. Ex- 
change rate flexibility-that  is, a devaluation-was  used when capital out- 
flow pressures dominated (1994-95). The sharp fiscal adjustment and mon- 
etary tightening subsequently helped to keep the current account deficit 
under  control.  Strong productivity  growth (supported  by  structural  re- 
forms)-unit  labor costs declined sharply-has  been another key factor 
keeping the current account to manageable proportions. 
9.4.5  Russia , 
Capital flows to and from Russia were characterized by  large official 
inflows (on average $3.5 billion during 1993-96),  very large capital out- 
flows or “capital flight” (errors and omissions in the balance of payments 
averaged $8 billion in  1995-96),  and since 1996 a surge in portfolio in- 
flows, mostly in the form of purchases of treasury bills (GKO). The surge 
in both official and portfolio flows was closely linked with the large financ- 
ing requirements of the budget-8.1  percent of GDP on average during 
1993-97-and  since 1996 with the government’s strategy to increase the 
share of foreign financing of fiscal deficits as a way of reducing domestic 
financial  and  inflationary  pressures.  While the conditions  attached  to 
official flows has been supportive of ongoing reform efforts in the country, 
legal uncertainties, weak institutions, criminality, and limited opportuni- 
ties for foreigners to participate in privatizations may explain why  FDI 
has been relatively (to GDP) low. FDI averaged $600 million in  1993-94 
and $1.9 billion in  1995-96.  However, further increases are anticipated 
over the coming years as a result of reforms conducive to improving the 
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business environment for foreign investors (e.g., faster privatization, im- 
provements to the collateral system, land and tax reform, changes to the 
bankruptcy  law,  improved transparency in the accounts of  state enter- 
prises, and national treatment for foreign investors). 
The scale of capital outflows (to the extent that they result from tax 
avoidance or evasion) in part explains the difficulties that the government 
faces in reducing its deficit. Capital outflows may also help explain why 
the sharp tightening of monetary policy in  1996 induced a strong rise in 
portfolio inflows (as Russians reinvested their money back into the coun- 
try). Inflation has fallen substantially from  131 percent in 1995 to 21.8 
percent in  1996 and to  11 percent in  1997. Interest rate declines lagged 
behind, however, with the average treasury bill rate falling from 176 per- 
cent in 1995 to 102 percent in 1996 and 33 percent in 1997. The resulting 
high real interest rates, combined with the sharp real appreciation of the 
currency in  1995 and  1996, have been key  motives behind the surge in 
portfolio  flows targeting  fixed income instruments.  Portfolio  investors, 
mostly over two hundred foreign investment funds, primarily purchased 
treasury bills, with purchases in April 1997 peaking at $2 billion. As real 
interest rates declined in  1997, investors have been increasingly targeting 
traded shares of Russian enterprises: In early 1997, they owned about one- 
third  of  such  shares,  or about  $3  billion.  Unlike  other  large  capital- 
importing countries in the region, Russia did not pursue deliberate poli- 
cies to slow down capital inflows. However, the exchange rate flexibility 
conferred by its wide exchange rate band has presumably been some deter- 
rent against short-term portfolio flows. 
9.5  Econometric Tests and Evaluation 
The above sections suggest that the reasons for the capital flows are 
largely the pursuit  of economic reform. They also make clear  that the 
factors influencing capital flows have differed by the types of capital flow. 
Furthermore, policy responses (e.g., degree of sterilization, liberalization, 
or imposition of capital controls) have also differed by the degree and type 
of capital flows. To make these relationships more precise and to study the 
separate effects of some of these factors we provide some regression results 
in this section. 
The main aim of the regressions is to try to explain the magnitude of 
the various types of capital flows for individual countries. Common with 
the existing literature (e.g., Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart  1993; Chu- 
han, Claessens, and Mamingi 1998; Hernandez and Rudolph 1995; Taylor 
and Sarnio 1997; see Montiel and Reinhart 1997 for a review of this litera- 
ture), we  distinguish two groups of explanatory variables: international 
factors (“push factors”) and domestic factors (“pull factors”). Push fac- 
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capital and are outside the control of a particular recipient country. Pull 
factors are country-specific factors and conditions influencing the interest 
of foreign capital of investing in that particular country. Some of these 
factors are under the control of the country, some are initial conditions, 
and others are outcomes which are in  part influenced by  capital flows 
themselves. 
For the group of pull factors, we use the U.S.-dollar, six-month LIBOR 
interest rate and the economic growth in OECD countries. We expect that 
declines in world interest rates will have a positive effect on capital flows 
to CEE and FSU, as that will make the rate of return on investing in these 
countries higher relative to other alternatives. The effect of an increase in 
OECD growth rate is less obvious. On one hand, it will likely be associated 
with a rise in the rate of return on investment in OECD countries, thus 
reducing the attractiveness of investing in transition economies. On the 
other hand, higher growth may raise the supply of savings in OECD coun- 
tries, thus stimulating capital flows. 
The group of pull factors is divided into policy factors: “reform efforts,” 
initial conditions, and “outcomes.” Obviously, it is difficult to quantify the 
degree of policy reform a country has undertaken in absolute terms. The 
very similar starting position of most of the transition economies-con- 
trolled prices, little private sector activity, limited institutional develop- 
ment, and so forth-makes  it somewhat easier to quantify at least the 
relative degree of policy reform in CEE and FSU. We use the liberalization 
index from De Melo, Gelb, and Denizer (1996) to rank countries in their 
relative reform efforts. This index, an indicator between 0 and 1, is avail- 
able for each country  and for each year and aims to measure how far 
the country has progressed in liberalizing prices, trade, and private sector 
activities, including  privatization.  The initial  conditions  and  outcomes 
variables are more difficult to separate, as capital flows are likely to inter- 
act with and affect current outcomes, which then become initial conditions 
for subsequent capital flows. We  use the country’s GDP growth rate, infla- 
tion, fiscal balance, private saving, and, as a credit worthiness indicator, 
the change in the country’s reserves. We lag the change in the country’s 
reserves and the two saving variables by  one period to avoid possible si- 
multaneity (as the sum of private, public, and foreign saving adds up to 
the change in reserves). In addition, we also use a dummy for the ten CEE 
countries likely to become EU members. l2 
We  focus separately on factors that have likely influenced short-term 
private capital flows (“arbitrage factors”). In  particular,  we  use the ex- 
12. We use the following ten countries that have been identified by  the EU as candidates: 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia,  Romania, Bulgaria, the Slovak 
Republic, Lithuania, and Latvia. The first five have recently started negotiations with the 
EU; we set the dummy equal to 2 for these countries. The dummy is set to 1 for the other 
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change rate adjusted  rate of return on holding domestic assets (i.e., the 
nominal domestic interest ratesI3 minus  the rate  of change in the local 
currency/dollar exchange rate) minus the US.-dollar interest rate. We also 
investigate the relationship  between different types of capital flows and 
domestic credit growth, as important reinforcing  effects for other devel- 
oping countries have been  found between private  capital flows and the 
rate of domestic credit expansion. Depending on the quality of financial 
intermediation, these reinforcing effects can lead to subsequent problems, 
as has been found for East Asian countries (see Alba et al. 1999). 
We  perform  regressions  for  seven  different  classifications  of  capital 
flows, focusing mainly on the source of capital: total capital flows, official 
flows, all private flows, FDI, commercial debt flows, portfolio flows (bonds 
and equity), and short-term flows. We  study both total flows as well as 
categories within these flows because there might be substitution between 
the various  both in a narrow sense (e.g., portfolio flows and FDI 
can be substituted in a particular transaction) as well as in a broader mac- 
roeconomic sense (e.g., large inflows of one kind can encourage or deter 
flows of another kind). 
We run our regressions in an unbalanced panel setup using a sample of 
twenty-one countries for the years  1992-96.  The panel is unbalanced as 
we do not have data for our independent variables for each year for each 
country and have private capital outflows figures for only a few countries. 
We also had to eliminate three countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Tajikistan)  for lack of  reliable data. All  our dependent  variables,  US.- 
dollar capital flows, are scaled  by  U.S.-dollar GNP based on the Atlas 
method  of the World  Bank-which  uses the moving average of the ex- 
change rate  over three  years-to  convert  local  currency  GNP to U.S.- 
dollar GNP. This way  we  smooth out the effect  of large real  exchange 
rate movements. 
We have the option of estimating the regression model with individual 
effects or with a common constant term. The first, the fixed effects model, 
assumes that differences across the countries can be captured in differ- 
ences  in  the constant term. The other option is  to use  ordinary  least 
squares  and estimate the regression  model  assuming that  the constant 
term is the same across countries. To determine which type of estimation 
was most appropriate, we  conducted F-tests for each regression,  testing 
the hypothesis that the constant terms are all equal. The results suggested 
that for total, official, private, FDT, and commercial debt flows an estima- 
tion using a common constant, in addition to the EU-accession dummy 
13. We  use as much as possible the local treasury bill  rate. For those countries where 
treasury bill rates were not available, we use the interbank interest rate or the bank lending rate. 
14. We would like to thank Michael Dooley for reminding us of this possibility. Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  329 
variable, will provide the most consistent and efficient estimators. For the 
remaining types of flows, portfolio flows and short-term debt flows, the 
fixed effects model was more appropriate. 
We correct for heteroskedasticity in the error terms of the regressions. 
In particular, the size of the country has an effect on the relationships. We 
expect that  this effect arises for several reasons. First, because  of fixed 
costs of acquiring information, we  expect that small countries exhibit a 
less clear relationship between explanatory variables and capital flows, as 
investors will expend fewer resources in analyzing small country charac- 
teristics. Second, the lumpiness of some of the flows, particularly FDI but 
also of official flows, may make for more noisy relationships of flows (when 
scaled by GDP) for smaller countries. Third, we expect smaller countries 
to be less economically diversified and more affected by external and inter- 
nal shocks, thus again creating more noisy relationships. Fourth, available 
data are likely more problematic  for small countries as their  statistical 
systems are less well developed. Plotting the error terms against the size 
of the country confirms this type of heteroskedasticity. For these reasons 
we use the estimated cross-section residual variances as weights in the re- 
gressions. 
In light of  the discussion from the previous sections, we  start with a 
benchmark regression for all seven categories of capital flows with the 
following explanatory variables: reform index, a dummy for EU accession 
(which takes the value of 2 for those five countries currently in negotia- 
tions, 1 for the other five countries, and 0 for all other countries), and the 
change in the level of foreign exchange reserves (with declines in reserves 
having a positive sign). As a second step we add single additional explana- 
tory variables, thus keeping the total number of variables to four. Results 
for these seven regressions are presented in table 9.4. 
We find that the reform and reserves variables are significant explana- 
tory variables of all categories of flows; the EU dummy is significant for 
two of the seven categories. Not surprisingly, we  find that the effort in 
undertaking reform in a particular country is positively associated with 
all  types of flows, except for official and portfolio flows. This suggests 
that reforms were important motivating factors for private capital flows. 
Reform effort also matters in determining official flows, but with a negative 
coefficient. This would suggest that official financing went to those coun- 
tries that have reformed less. The correct interpretation, however, might 
be that official financing went to those countries that had achieved less 
reform initially, but that some conditionality was being applied in official 
financing. Reform efforts may then have increased following large official 
flows, and over time the official flows to those countries that had achieved 
more reform declined. This overall negative relationship for official flows 
thus  reflects  that  they  preceded  reform  efforts and  fell off  as  reforms Table 9.4  Regressions Results-Benchmark  Model 
Dependent Variable 
Total  Total Private  Official  Short-Term  Commercial 
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Notes: The estimation procedure is generalized least squares with cross section residual variances as weights. ns = no significant; + = positive significant; 
- = negative significant. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
"Due to a high correlation between reform index and fiscal balance (0.83). the sign of the coefficient for fiscal balance becomes negative when reform index 
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progre~sed.'~  This result suggests that a dynamic model of official capital 
flows and progress in liberalization is required. The negative sign for the 
reform variable in the case of portfolio flows likely reflects that a signifi- 
cant part of portfolio  flows was directed toward the financing of fiscal 
deficits, which may have been larger in countries that reformed less. 
For FDI, the dummy for EU accession is  positively significant. It is 
likely that EU accession is most important for FDI as the prospects of 
increased integration with Western Europe has meant that both opportu- 
nities for favorable investments and overall credit worthiness increase in 
these countries more than in others. 
The negative sign for the lagged change in reserves variable for most 
flows reflects the fact that increased credit worthiness of countries, that is, 
as they increased reserves, motivated further capital flows. The positive 
sign for the lagged changes in reserves variable for official flows reflects 
that, at least initially, official financing was made available on a financing 
needs basis: As reserves declined, more official financing was made avail- 
able. Similarly for portfolio flows, much of which was directed to financing 
of fiscal deficits, financing need was an important determinant. 
As mentioned, we added to this basic regression a number of additional 
variables, including each separately. Specifically, we included public sector 
balance, current as well as lagged one period (to avoid simultaneity be- 
tween foreign and domestic savings), private savings (lagged one period), 
domestic credit growth, lagged official flows, and the interest differential. 
We also include the two push variables, LIBOR and OECD growth rates. 
Rather than presenting all the detailed regressions results, we  simply pre- 
sent whether the particular additional variable was significant, and if  so, 
with what sign (see table 9.4). 
We  find that fiscal surpluses, both contemporaneous and lagged, are 
positively related with about half of the different types of flows. This sug- 
gests that increased fiscal surpluses stimulate foreign savings through a 
credit worthiness effect. The negative coefficients for official flows show 
that official flows to the public sector have been associated with larger 
fiscal deficits (see also fig. 9.10 in section 9.3). The coefficient is also nega- 
tive for portfolio flows, likely because countries with larger fiscal deficits 
receive more  portfolio flows through  foreign purchases of  government 
bonds (particularly Russia). Lagged private saving has a negative coeffi- 
cient for all flows except commercial debt flows. This suggests that there 
is some substitution between foreign and private saving, a general finding 
for developing countries (see Cohen 1993). The coefficients are small, how- 
ever, so concerns about the sustainability of foreign flows, as they end up 
15. A regression of reform on lagged official flows indeed confirms this relationship. Using 
a fixed-effect estimator, we find that the coefficient for lagged  official flows is significantly 
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financing some share of consumption, may not be too serious. The positive 
sign for private saving in the commercial debt flows regression may reflect 
a credit worthiness effect. 
Domestic credit growth is significantly negative in the case of total pri- 
vate flows, short-term flows, and commercial debt flows. This suggests that 
the typical reinforcing effect of capital flows on domestic credit growth is 
not prevalent in these countries. This may be because of the poor institu- 
tional development of the domestic financial sector. The negative sign may 
also reflect that the enterprise restructuring required in these countries was 
often achieved through tight (hard) budget constraints. Countries with less 
growth in domestic credit may have been more successful with enterprise 
restructuring; they thus were more likely candidates for private capital 
flows because their credit worthiness in general increased and because a 
greater fraction of domestic firms were restructured and thus of interest 
to foreign investors. 
Lagged official flows have a positive effect on almost all types of capital 
flows. Since the regression already controls for the reform effort of the 
particular country, which thus captures the degree to which official lenders 
may have been successful in their reform conditionality, there is an inde- 
pendent effect of past official lending on private capital flows. This may be 
because official lending acted as an important signal to private creditors 
regarding the commitment of the country to undertake further reforms. 
The interest differential variable is significant for only two of  the types 
of capital flows: portfolio flows and short-term flows. Only for portfolio 
flows does it have the expected positive sign, while for short-term flows the 
sign is negative. This suggests that, once one controls for a few basic vari- 
ables, capital flows at large have not been motivated by arbitrage conditions. 
Push factors appear to play a role in motivating capital flows, but with 
the opposite sign from what is commonly found. Specifically, increases in 
international interest rates are associated with increased capital flows. And 
higher OECD growth rates also increase capital flows. This contradictory 
finding raises some questions of its own, but at least it does not suggest 
that capital flows to these countries are at risk for increases in interna- 
tional interest rates and OECD growth. It may rather be that increases in 
OECD growth enhance the supply of foreign savings available for these 
countries. 
Table 9.5 provides the regression results for the specification chosen for 
each type of  capital flow. The explanatory variables were chosen  after 
some experimentation to achieve a reasonable overall fit for the regression, 
within constraints of data availability. 
In the case of total flows, reform efforts, EU accession, and changes in 
reserves have the same sign as before. Additional significant explanatory 
variables are the lagged fiscal balance and lagged official capital flows, 
both with a positive coefficient. Table 9.5  Panel Data Regression-Extended  Model 
Dependent Variable 
Total  Total Private  Official  Short-Term  Commercial 
Flows  Flows  Flows  FDT  Portfolio"  Debt"  Debt,i 
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"Fixed effects model estimation was used for these types of flows, given that the hypothesis that the country effects are the same was rejected (see F-values). 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Total private capital flows depend strongly on reform efforts. We again 
find a positive coefficient for those countries with possible accession to the 
EU and a negative relationship with the lagged change in foreign exchange 
reserves, which  suggests that  credit worthiness  is an important  factor. 
Higher (lagged) fiscal savings tends to raise private flows, suggesting that 
credit worthiness and reform perceptions are influenced positively by re- 
duced fiscal deficits. More generally, the positive relationship between pri- 
vate capital flows and fiscal saving suggests a complementarity between 
public and foreign saving. We  also find a positive coefficient for lagged 
official flows, a possible confirmation of the signal from past official lend- 
ing on future reforms and credit worthiness. Private capital flows are nega- 
tively related to domestic credit growth, suggesting that contractions in 
credit growth may have served as a signal of reform. 
In the case of official flows, the results show that reform efforts again 
enter with a negative (but insignificant) coefficient. Countries that are can- 
didates to become members of the EU have received less official financing, 
suggesting that, because they received more private financing and pro- 
gressed further in reforms, they were in less need of official financing. This 
need for financing is again confirmed in the positive coefficient for the 
reserve variable, indicating that declines in foreign exchange reserves are 
associated with more official financing. Lagged fiscal surpluses have a pos- 
itive relationship with official flows, suggesting official flows were made 
conditional on past fiscal efforts. The high correlation between fiscal sur- 
pluses and reform efforts, however, implies that when the reform variable 
is removed, the sign of the fiscal surplus variable becomes negative, that 
is, there is collinearity between regressors. The interpretation in this latter 
case is more straightforward: Lower fiscal surpluses (higher deficits) are 
associated with larger official flows. The coefficient for OECD growth rate 
is significantly positive, suggesting that the supply of official saving may 
have been a positive function of the business cycle in industrial countries. 
As we  showed above, FDI is the most important private capital flow 
for most countries. In this specification, FDI is dependent as before on 
the three major independent variables: reform efforts, EU accession, and 
reserve changes. Not surprisingly, as for all private capital flows, FDI is 
greatly influenced by reform efforts, as the t-statistic for the reform index 
is large. Lankes and Stern (1999) and Martin and Selowsky (1997) had al- 
ready noted this. Lagged official flows are positively significant, suggest- 
ing again a signaling function of official flows. 
Portfolio flows appear to be driven by  a number of factors, some of 
which are collinear, thus leading to mostly insignificant coefficients when 
many variables are included. The best regression result is then also not 
very informative. Fiscal balance (lagged one period) now appears to in- 
crease portfolio flows, a finding different from the earlier regression where 
the opposite coefficient was found. Interestingly, the interest rates differ- Flows to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union  335 
ential variable is not significant. As noted, not all of these relationships 
are robust to inclusion of other independent variables, in part likely be- 
cause of the collinearity of the independent variables, but also because 
portfolio flows are relatively small and have occurred only in more recent 
years, thus leading to weaker relationships. 
Lastly, we  regressed the flow of short-term debt flows and commercial 
debt flows. As  noted, short-term debt has become a large share of private 
capital flows in recent years for a number of countries. Private debt flows 
and short-term debt flows appear to be driven by the same factors, except 
for reform efforts. The degree of reform matters in a positive way for com- 
mercial debt flows and negatively for short-term debt flows. The negative 
sign for short-term flows, which differs from the results in table 9.4, could 
reflect that lenders were less willing to extend long-term funds, and rela- 
tively more willing to extend short-term funds, to countries that had un- 
dertaken less reform. Increases in reserves lead to larger commercial debt 
and short-term flows (the latter is insignificant, however). This suggests 
that credit worthiness also matters for these flows. Private debt flows ap- 
pear to be substitutes for domestic private saving as the coefficients are 
negative. Finally, OECD growth rates matter for short-term flows. We find 
no evidence of a push effect, as the coefficient for the LIBOR interest rates 
is insignificant; in other words, the decline in international interest rates 
has not stimulated commercial debt or short-term flows. Arbitrage factors, 
that is, the interest differential, do not appear to have a significant effect 
on short-term flows, which is somewhat surprising. 
In short, the overall results indicate that flows are driven for most coun- 
tries by fundamental reforms and credit worthiness. The possibility of EU 
accession has been an important determinant of private flows, especially 
FDI. For official flows, EU accession seems to have lowered the need for 
official flows. Increased fiscal saving has led to higher volumes for most 
flows while increased private saving has been associated with lower capital 
flows, suggesting some degree of substitutability between private and for- 
eign saving. Official flows appear to have had an important signaling value 
for private capital flows. For no flows did high interest rate differentials 
(adjusted for exchange rate movements) appear to have mattered. Push 
effects are only found for commercial debt and short-term debt flows, with 
growth in OECD countries encouraging flows to the region. 
9.6  Conclusions and Forward-Looking Issues 
Capital flows to CEE and FSU have been increasing rapidly in recent 
years-a  growth rate of 34 percent per year during 1991-97  but are still a 
small fraction of global capital flows to developing countries (about  18 
percent in 1997). As  structural reforms have progressed, the composition 
of flows has changed: Official flows have declined, and private capital flows 336  Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and Rossana Polastri 
have increased to account by  1997 for about 73 percent of total flows. 
Within private capital flows, FDI was  the most important  followed by 
portfolio flows. As the direct and spillover effects of FDI on human, tech- 
nological, and physical capital accumulation are crucial for the rapid and 
effective integration of  the transition  economies to the world economy, 
this bodes well for these countries. 
Perhaps more than in other developing countries, reform efforts have 
been the most important determinant of private flows, particularly of FDI. 
Other consistent determinants of private flows have been prospective EU 
membership-the  ten countries that applied for EU membership attracted 
more private flows (and relied less on official flows)-and  credit worthi- 
ness. Credit worthiness proxies such as increases in reserves, lower fiscal 
deficits, and greater past official flows were mostly positively correlated 
with greater private flows. The association between declines in private sav- 
ing and higher private debt flows, however, causes some concern. 
One key policy implication is that the sustainability of capital flows is 
associated with the sustainability of reform efforts. The consistency and 
continuity of structural reforms-particularly  those that are conducive to 
EU integration and improved credit worthiness-can  influence the source 
(official versus private) as well as the type of private capital flow (e.g., the 
reform’s impact on FDI flows is positive while the impact on short-term 
debt flows is negative). This, in turn, implies that reform efforts matter not 
just for the level of capital flows, but also for the maturity and potential 
volatility of flows. 
The shift from debt-creating flows to the public sector in the 1980s to 
non-debt-creating flows to the private sector in the 1990s also has implica- 
tions for the efficiency of resource and risk allocation. For one, private 
recipients of capital have better incentives to allocate capital into higher 
return  projects. The shift to non-debt-creating flows, in turn, implies a 
better risk-sharing  arrangement  (of fixed-term foreign currency  obliga- 
tions) vis-a-vis foreign investors. 
Another feature of capital flows to the region has been the increase in 
the share of short-term debt and portfolio flows since 1993. The concen- 
tration of these potentially more volatile short-term flows in 1993-96  in a 
few countries raises questions about sustainability of capital flows and 
vulnerability to international shocks in these economies. For the majority 
of countries in the region, however, the absolute and relative level of short- 
term foreign obligations is small compared to the size of their economies 
as well as compared to the high levels of their foreign exchange reserves. 
So far, only a few countries have had to deal with episodes of overheat- 
ing. Looking forward, it is likely that more countries will have to deal with 
the constraints that the level and structure of external liabilities may pose 
on macroeconomic  and financial policy. The experiences in  the region 
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countercyclical fiscal policies (to counter the potential overheating caused 
by large capital inflows) and better supervision and tighter prudential reg- 
ulations on the financial sector (such as raising reserve requirements on 
foreign borrowings). Sterilization of inflows and exchange rate flexibility 
can be effective in the short run to reduce large capital inflows and their 
impact, but are usually constrained by  quasi-fiscal implications  (in the 
case of sterilization) and by competitive pressures (in the case of exchange 
rate flexibility), for example, from exporters. 
Looking forward, our analysis raises two other issues of potential con- 
cern: fiscal sustainability and the quality of domestic financial intermedi- 
ation. As already pointed out by Buiter (1996), some countries appear to 
face  fiscal  sustainability  issues,  especially  when  including  public  off- 
balance-sheet activities. Buiter highlights the combination of high domes- 
tic real interest rates and the rapid buildup of domestic liabilities, both 
explicit and implicit through the banking systems. We find evidence here 
of potential problems with fiscal sustainability from an external perspec- 
tive as capital flows are sometimes associated with larger fiscal deficits and 
high interest rates, a combination that is seldom sustainable. For transition 
economies, potential or hidden liabilities in state-owned enterprises (e.g., 
resulting from poor  governance), in weak financial institutions, and in 
insolvent social security and health systems thus need to be carefully mon- 
itored. The risk otherwise may be  a sudden decline in perceived credit 
worthiness, leading to a sharp contraction or reversal of private flows. 
A second concern relates to the quality of domestic intermediation of 
(external and domestic) funds. The quality of the financial sectors in tran- 
sition economies is still weak. Cross-country indicators of quality of do- 
mestic intermediation (such as those in the annual reports of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  [EBRD]) suggest for some 
countries a limited institutional development and a weak financial condi- 
tion, including large amounts of nonperforming loans. While we  did not 
find that the quality of financial intermediation itself was an important 
explanatory factor of capital flows, it would be useful to further analyze 
the issue of banking fragility, also as that has been an issue in other emerg- 
ing markets and likely a key policy area. A particularly useful area of re- 
search could be to investigate the interactions between high domestic credit 
growth, weak domestic financial intermediation, and the type of capital 
flows. 
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Comment  Michael P.  Dooley 
This paper provides a valuable review and evaluation of private capital 
flows into formerly planned economies. It is particularly useful because it 
provides a factual basis for comparing these countries’ experiences with 
those of other emerging markets.  The paper was completed before the 
crisis in Russia but cautions readers that Russia and the other formerly 
planned economies are vulnerable to a reversal of capital inflows. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this paper is the recognition that 
recorded private capital inflows to Russia and some of the other countries 
studied were completely and simultaneously matched by  unrecorded pri- 
vate capital outflows. A simple comparison of current account balances, 
official lending, and reserve accumulation leads to this conclusion. 
This, in turn, poses a difficult problem for the econometric work re- 
ported and its interpretation. The main result is that reform and reserve ac- 
cumulation seem to predict recorded capital inflows. But why would these 
same factors tend to generate unrecorded private capital outflows? The 
answer probably lies in a more structural story about the incentives faced 
by residents and nonresidents and governments that lead to cross-hauling 
of financial claims and liabilities. 
In a relatively simple model with a representative private sector investor 
and a government, we can see how official capital outflows in the form of 
reserve accumulation might be systematically matched by  private capital 
inflows. The familiar story is that sterilized exchange market intervention 
designed to resist currency appreciation generates a pattern of interest rate 
differentials and exchange rate expectations that induce private investors 
to arbitrage excess returns in the home markets. As the authors point out, 
this seems to play some role in the pattern of capital inflows observed in 
several of the countries studied. 
But on top of this model we  must also consider at least two sets of 
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private investors that have different incentives or constraints in allocating 
their financial portfolios. One possibility is that an extreme case of home 
bias was being reversed as these markets opened to international capital 
flows. Residents of Russia and the other countries studied were not per- 
mitted to hold foreign assets in the old regime and may have been willing 
to accept relatively low expected returns on foreign assets. At the same 
time, nonresidents may have seen Russian assets as a valuable addition to 
their portfolio since these returns may have been  independent  of their 
existing portfolios. This is a welfare improving story that is certainly con- 
sistent with the observation that reform seems to have been an important 
determinant of private capital inflows and outflows. 
The problem with this interpretation is in understanding why the inflows 
should be so easily observed in balance of payments data while the out- 
flows are entirely absent from the data. While many interpretations are 
possible, a plausible answer is that some residents had good reasons to 
want their wealth in a form that the government could not tax. This can 
lead to a volatile situation. In this case there are two types of private inves- 
tors because recorded capital inflows are insured by the government, usu- 
ally through the banking system, while unrecorded capital outflows can- 
not be taxed by  the government. In this case private capital inflows and 
outflows generate private gains from trade but the welfare implications are 
quite different. In general such a pattern  of capital flows will generate 
costly crises when governments’ capacity to insure is exhausted, outcomes 
now clear with the benefit of hindsight. 